Somaliland iyo Somaliya waxay Wadaagaan waxyaabo badan, oo ay ka mid yihiin:
Laba dal oo jaar ah(Deris ah), Diin,dhaqan,Af iyo Dhiig waxay kale oo ay wadaagan iyaga oo ka mid ah dalalkii Afrikaanka ahaa ee xornimadooda helay 1960.Waxay wadaagaan ganacsi iyo isku socod aan xakameysneyn,waxay wadaagi jireen nidaam siyaaseed ku dhisnaa doorasho iyo afgambi ciidan oo salka ku hayey keli tashanimo.Waxay wadaageen dagaalo sokeeye iyo burbur aad u baahsan, oo keenay barakac iyo qaxootinimo.Arimahan iyo kuwo kale oo la mid ahba waxaa la odhankaraa wey wadaagaan marka I uud loo eego waayaha labadan dal ee jaarka ah .
Waxay Ku kala Duwan yihiin:
Waa laba dal oo ay kala duweyn waayaha siyaasadeed ee mid walba u hagey jahooyin iyo wadooyin kan kale ka duwan. Waa laba dal oo Siyaasad ahaan ku kala tegey laga bilaabo 18 May 1991, ilaa maanta waxay kukala duwan yihiin,Dastuurka,Lacagta,Passporka xisbiyada siyaasadeed,sharciyadaha ,nidaamada maamul,nabadgelya dhaqalaha,cashuuraha,qaabdhismeedka hayadaha dowlada,Dimuqradiyada iyo arimo badan oo kale.Daraasadaha ama qoraalada laga sameeyey farqiga u dhexeeya Somaliland iyo Somalia waxaa ka mid ah kuwan ee bal ila wadaaga:
Dr. Sarah Phillips (The University of Sydney political scientist has a great new Developmental Leadership program). oo aynu ka soo qaadaney daraasadeedii qaybo ka mid ah , Phillips, S. (2013). Political Settlements and State Formation: The Case of Somaliland. Research Paper 23. Developmental Leadership Program.Qodobadan:
• It was not simply the lack of direct external assistance that mattered in restoring and maintaining peace, but the fact that Somalilanders were not pressured to accept ‘template’ political institutions from outside and could negotiate their own locally devised, and locally legitimate, institutional arrangements.
• This political settlement has become increasingly exclusive since the last national conference ended in 1997, but it nevertheless underlines the ‘rules of the game’ that regulate competition over power and resources, and the handling of differences in non-violent ways.
• In Somaliland there are several powerful ideas that help to reinforce a common reference point for political actors to draw from when framing processes of political change.
• In the context of Somaliland, where the ‘state’ is technically absent, the narratives constructed around the idea of Somaliland as an exceptional and inherently legitimate sovereign entity feed directly into the ongoing negotiations and power struggles that give shape to its political settlement.
• Much of the ‘failed states’ literature suggests that when the state does not hold the monopoly on violence, violence will embroil its competitors as they struggle to claim the monopoly for themselves. This is a very structural explanation that takes no account of the agency of those supposed competitors who can both perceive, and act to alter, their circumstances. In Somaliland, those potential competitors were scarred by years of violence and deeply cognisant of the consequences of defecting from a settlement that promised peace, even if it did not promise a great deal else.
Sidoo kale waxaa soo xigtey qoraalkaasi oo aragtidiisa ku muujiyey ciwwana uga dhigay Somaliland v Somalia: great new paper on an extraordinary ‘natural experiment’ in aid and governance
February 19, 2014
Duncan Green, strategic adviser for Oxfam GB and author of ‘From Poverty to Power’.waxaana uu qoray sidan:
Her conclusions do not make comfortable reading, for they trample on any number of received wisdoms. Try these on for size:
Somaliland’s government has received virtually no direct financial aid, largely because it is not internationally recognized. The country itself gets a lot of aid via NGOs, UN projects etc etc, but the government has been generally outside this loop, forced to rely on local sources of funding.
Perhaps more important than the financial aspects, this meant there was no pressure to accept template political institutions from outside. Instead, Somaliland had time and political space to negotiate its own (e.g. clan-based) political settlements. The process involved a series of ad hoc, messy, consultative, and local peace conferences. In the most important conference, in 1993, one group stalled proceedings by reciting the Koran for several days. That’s not in the good governance playbook.
The peace process was almost entirely locally funded, due to Somaliland’s unrecognized status (so no bilateral aid or loans were available). That produced a strong sense of local ownership (literally). In the words of one minister, when asked by Phillips about aid ‘Aid is not what we desire because [then] they decide for us what we need’.
What’s less discussed is the power politics that underlies this transition. The second president used private loans to demobilise about 5,000 militia fighters. He offered stability (and tax breaks) to the business elite in exchange for funding demobilisation and the nascent state institutions. This was effective but certainly not inclusive – the elite came mainly from the President’s own clan. But according to Phillips, Somalilanders generally still see it as a legitimate process – that’s what leaders do.
Many Thanks
M J Farah. Political analyst and writer, BEng (Hon), BA, AVCE, Cert. C. Journalism