hogaanka.org

28 SANO OO HORUMAR AH SOMALILAND IYO 28 SANO OO DIB U DHACA SOMALIYA Q.2 aad

Qaybta 2aad.

Somaliya wakhtigaasi waxa ay isku hayteen Kursiga Madaxtinimada oo loolan adagi ka taagnaa waxaa lagu hashiin waayey cidii dalka madaxweyne ka noqon lahayd kol hadii Maxamed Siyaad Bare laga Saarey Magaala Madaxdii Somaliya ee Muqdisho.

Gen.Caydiid iyo Cali Mahdi oo isku Beel ka Soo jeeda ayaa loolan adagi ku dhexmarey fagaarayaasha siyaasada ee Konfurta Somaliya,Waxaana la kala Saftey kooxo siyaasiin ah oo aan isku raad ama fikir siyaasadeed ahayn kuwaas oo ka mid ahaa xoogaga kursi doonka ah ee aan wax kursiga madaxnimada dhaafsani aaney u muuqan.

Sidaa darteed Bishi November ee Sanadkii 1991 waxaa bilowday in xaalada Somaliya ee Koonfurta ay yeelatay waji Cusub oo aan dagaal ka fursaneyn ay gacmaha iskula tagaan Gen.Caydiid iyo Cali Mahdi oo madaxweyne isku cumaamadey.Labadan oday waxay kawada tirsanayeen Ururkii USC.

Somaliland se Cudurkaa Kursi doonku wuu saf mareeyey( si fudud uu u dhaafay). Kala tegidii dhinaca Siyaasada ee Somaliland iyo Somaliya waxay bilaaban tay markii Somaliland Siyaasiinteeda odayadeeda aqoon yahankeedu isku raaceen in wadanka la wada dhiso oo aan kursi lagu mashquulin,Turunturooyinka iyo jidgooyada Somaliland in aaney taabo qaadin waa ay socotey oo dagaalku waa jirey balse cadaadisku waxaa uu u sii jeeday dhinaca Somaliya oo wakhtigaa unugyo kala duwani midba midka kale uga dheereenayey madaxnimada Somaliya sidaa darteed faragelinta arimaha gudaha ee Somaliland way yareyd wakhtigaasi oo xoogaga lidka ku ahi may firfircooneyn,waayo waxaa ay ku hawlanayeen Somaliya iyo arimaheeda,dhinaca kale Somaliland waxaa indhaha caalamka ka laliyey waayaha Somaliya oo noqotey Khabrigii Mucaawinooyinka iyo gaajada. Khilaafkii dhinaca hogaanka iyo madaxnimada ee Gen. Caydiid iyo Cali Mahdi u dhaxeeyey ayaa gaadhey ee ay somalida konfureed ay soo wajahdo xaalad bila adamnimo oo aad u xun sababteyna in, Kumanaal shacab ahi ay ku dhintaan dagaalkaas labad oday hogaaminayeen . Qamada midowbay ayaa isku keenay  si loo heshiisiiyo taas oo ay
March 3, 1992 – Maxamed Faarax Caydiid iyo Cali Mahdi Maxamed ay wada saxiixaan heshiis xabbad joojin ah oo ay soo abaabushey Qaramada Midoobey, laakiin waxay hor jogayaashu ku heshiin waayeen sida loo maaraynayo xabbad joojinta . Dhinaca kale Somaliland wax heshiisiinaya oo debeda uga yimaada lama hayo ilaa wakhtigan waayo umeyba baahan shisheeya heshiisiiya.

28 SANO OO HORUMAR AH SOMALILAND IYO 28 SANO OO DIB U DHACA SOMALIYA Q.1aad

Maqaalkaygan waxaa aan isku barbar kooban ku sameenayaa waxa yaabaha ay ku kala tageen Somaliland iyo Somaliya 28 sanadood ee ugu dambeeyey iyo sabaha keenay iney kala durkaan oo ay ka kala horumaraan dhinacyada Siyaasad,Dhaqaalaha,Waxbarasha iyo Caafimaadka.Aniga oo midmid uga hadlidoona waana dood furan oo si cilmiyeysan aynu iskula eegi doono waxyaabahaasi.

Somalidu waxay ku maahmaahdaa Aqoon La’aani Waa Iftiin La’aan!

Sanadkii 1991 bishii May 17 go’aanadii wada jirka ahaa ee ay wadagaadheen Madax dhaqameedada , Waxgaradka, ganacsatada ,siyaasintaSomaliland iyo Ururkii SNM ee Shirkii Burco ayaa lagu go’aamiyey qaraar dhigaya in Somaliland ka noqotey Midowgii labadii gobol ee Woqooyiga( Somaliland 26 Juun 1960) iyo Konfurta(Italiana Somali 1 July 1960) ee ay Ku midoobeen 1 July 1960 hal dal oo la yidhaahdo Jamhuuriyada Somaliya.

Wixii laga bilaabo 18 May 1991 Somaliland Waxay hirgalisey oo ay goosatey go’aankaas taariikhiga ah oo Shacabkii Somalilandna aad u taageereen muujiyeena sida ay uga raali yihiin dib ula soo noqoshada xoriyadoodii ay sida fudud ee bilaa shuruuda ah ugu wareejiyeen Somalidii Konfureed.

Go’aankaasi qodobada ku jirey waxaa ka mid ahaa in guud ahaanba dhibaatooyinkii uu abuuray Taliskii Maxamed Siyaad Bare ee uu reer reerka hubka iskugu dhiibey ee uu ku kala qaybiyey dadkii wada dhashay ee reer Somaliland aan wax aargoosi ah iyo wax dhibaato dambe ah oo bulshada dhexdeeda ah la geysan oo sidaa laysku saamaxo wadankana lawada dhisto oo Somaliland mid ah la abuuro dhinac kastana nabad iyo cadaalad lagu wada noolaado.

Go’aankaasi wuxuu ahaa mid sax ah oo wakhtigii ku haboonaa dhacay waana midka Somaliland ka badbaadiyey dhibaatada ka taagan ilaa hada mandaqada.

Shirkaa iyo qabanqaabadiisa ma jiro cid ka taageertay  sida dawlado shisheeye,hayado caalamiya iwm Waxgaradka iyo Siyaasiinta Somaliland ee wakhtigaasi  shirka qababqaabadiisa iyo habsami u socodkiisa  wadey  markaasi oo wax walba  oo tasiilad ahi aaney jirin dhaqaale,maamul,dawlad iwm balse waxgaradkii Wakhtigaasi guntiga u xidheen sidii ay u badbaadin la’aayeen umadooda Alle(swt) mahad dhamaanteed isaga ayaa iska leh waa uu u suurageliyey niyadaasi wanaagsan ee ay la yimaadeen iyo wanaagaasi.

Isweydiintu waxay tahay waxaa aynu maqalnaa Abaal gudyo Caalamiya oo la siiyo Shaqsiyaad ama hayado aduunka wax ku soo kordhiyey (Awarded for outstanding contributions for humanity in chemistry, literature, peace, physics, physiology or medicine and economic sciences).Sida  Peace Noble Braze ka iwm. Siyaasiintii iyo Madax dhaqameedkii shirkii Burco ee 1991 way istaahileen abaal gudkaa iyo mid ka sareeya ee haydaha bixiya Abaal marintaasi xagey la mareen?

Halkaa waxaad ka garan kartaa in xitaa aduunku kala bakheylay in lagu hambalyeyo nabada iyo wanaaga ka dhashay shirkii Burco ee taariikhda Caalamka aan hore uga dhicin in urur Hubeysan oo dal xoog ku qabsadey intuu Waxgaradii dalka iskugu yeedhay shir u qabtey lagaga arinsanayo mustaqbalka siyaasadeed ee dal waliba ka dhaceen xasuuqyada taariikhda caalamka naadirka ku ah sida ka dhacdey Somaliland Bishii May 1988 kii.

La soco qaybaha Dambe……….

Somaliland’s lessons in peace for Africa

By Greg Mills and Emily van Der Merwe• 8 May 2019

Twin scourges of khat-chewing and poor education standards, particularly among girls, continue to blight Somaliland’s economy and society. (Photo: Greg Mills).

Following a bitter civil war that saw the forces of Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre cruelly bomb and strip the capital of Hargeisa, the Somali National Movement booted out the occupiers and set about creating the conditions for stability in Somaliland which have endured for nearly three decades.

“A place that has made something out of virtually nothing” is how former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo describes the progress made by Somaliland.

His trip there this month was the first by an African president, current or past, since the territory re-declared its independence in 1991. In June 1960, Somaliland gained its independence from its colonial master Britain before making an ill-fated decision to join former Italian Somaliland five days later in a union that was envisaged ultimately to include French Somalia (now Djibouti), the Somali-dominated Ogaden region of Ethiopia (now Region 5) and a chunk of northern Kenya.

Following a bitter civil war that saw the forces of Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre cruelly bomb and strip the capital of Hargeisa (in which by 1990 only an estimated 2,000 of its former population of 500,000 remained), the Somali National Movement booted out the occupiers and set about creating the conditions for stability which have endured for nearly three decades.

Peace did not require vast external resources. There were none available anyway, at the time.

The peace process was constructed on five major internal meetings, starting with the Grand Conference of the Northern Peoples in Burao, held over six weeks, and concluding with the declaration of Somaliland’s independence from Somalia on 18 May 1991. 4

The declaration was signed in an octangular tin-roofed building near the colonial governor’s building, without electricity and running water, the white walls outside still pock-marked by bullet holes. The peace conferences were managed and financed by locals, bringing their own food and shelter. 3

They stuck with a winning formula. The last Somaliland conference in Boroma in 1993 was similarly held over five months under the trees. 3

Such events were bottom-up rather than top-down. Somalilanders concentrated on achieving peace, not on acquiring comforts and financial rents for delegates from the process, a feature which has continually by contrast blighted Somalia’s attempts to the south, where “conflict entrepreneurs” have fed off both the fighting and the talking in a top-down process financed by donors, and which has largely taken place outside the country. 5

Peace in Somaliland demanded persistence, as has the recovery which has followed.

The former British protectorate has developed a stable, democratic system of politics, merging modern and traditional elements. In 2002, Somaliland made the transition from a clan-based system to multi-party democracy after a 2001 referendum, retaining an Upper House of Elders (guurti), which secures the support of traditional clan-based power structures.

There have since been regular elections and frequent turnover of power between the main political parties. The 2003 presidential election was won by Dahir Riyale Kahin by just 80 votes in nearly half a million from Ahmed M Mahamoud Silanyo. The tables were turned between the two in 2010. Former Somali National Movement fighter Muse Bihi Abdi was elected in 2017, receiving 55% of the vote.

This is not the only check and balance. The rule of law, says the Chief Justice, Aadam X Cali Axmed, “demands a separation of powers and a strong judiciary.” The court system, which uses codified British law at the centre and forms of Sharia law in the district courts, has found its feet and grown in strength. Here, also, traditional and modern elements function side by side, with community courts outside the formal judicial system deciding on civil matters before reverting back for endorsement.

Critics say that Somaliland’s democracy has been facilitated by the dominance of a single clan, the Isaaq, unlike Somalia, which has to balance the competing interests and ambitions of four major clans and several smaller ones. This argument, however, understates the differences between the Isaaq’s sub-clans and sub-sub clans, ignores the internal violence that accompanied the birth process, which had to be resolved, and overlooks the tremendous hard work that has consistently gone into it to manage the outcomes peacefully and positively.

But peace, however successful, is just the start.

Today, Somaliland’s economy is growing, but straining. Over the past 20 years new businesses have sprung up, yet its infrastructure is poor. Some 70% of the population is under the age of 30. The formal youth unemployment rate is 75%. This situation has been worsened by the paucity of skills, as a result of which there is a contrasting dependency on foreign talent. Literacy is under 45% and just 20% for women.

The Somaliland government budget is just $200-million, three-quarters of which is spent on salaries and operational expenses. GDP is estimated at $646 per capita annually for four million people.

Outside of remittances, which provide 55% of the GDP of $2-billion, Somaliland depends on its sale of camels and goats, though this has suffered with a Saudi foot-and-mouth disease import ban except during the Haj, halving the annual exports to 1.2 million. This challenge has been worsened by the related pressure on grazing areas and the current drought, especially in the Haud, a broad strip of rich pastureland that straddles the Ethiopian-Somaliland border.

Progress has been complicated by the absence of international diplomatic recognition, adding a risk premium. No foreign government recognises Somaliland’s sovereignty, even though it fulfils all requirements for statehood, including the hosting of regular free and fair elections, the capacity to defend itself and the issuing of its own passports and currency.

Without international recognition, donor funding is just $150-million annually, most of which goes into roads and water infrastructure, and much of the rest into boosting agriculture. By comparison, war-torn Somalia receives more than $1-billion annually, in a perverse system which rewards chaos and penalises stability and democracy.

Ironically, precisely because of its failure, the Somali state headquartered in Mogadishu is little more than a Western-supported and African-military controlled client, leading Somaliland’s finance minister Saad Ali Shire to liken it to “parents throwing money at a problem child”.

In contrast with Somaliland’s self-reliance, without foreign cash and African Union troops Somalia’s internationally recognised government in Mogadishu would either retreat into exile or simply collapse. In Somalia, peace is a multibillion-dollar industry.

Save the involvement of Dubai Ports World in a $450-million development of the Berbera facility on the Gulf of Aden, foreign investors are few and far between. Although potential investors visit frequently, they are nearly always deterred by a simple challenge: Transferring money to and from Somaliland.

Another consequence of not being an internationally recognised state is that the Central Bank of Somaliland has so far been unable to register a SWIFT code, which would enable direct and secure international funds transfers. Finance sector experts reckon the premium of non-recognition to be “between 7%-8%” on the cost of money.

Within the country, however, transactions are virtually cashless and mobile banks such as Dahabshiil, the largest money transfer agency in Africa and the biggest bank in Somaliland, operate unhindered. The Somaliland shilling floats within a stable band, and inflation is single-digit.

“Somaliland has achieved as much as it has,” says Obasanjo “because it has depended on itself.” But now, for its economy to prosper it needs to resolve its international status.

Yet the most difficult peace negotiations lie ahead.

Recognition of Somaliland is unlikely to come from Africa, given that there is no single African country that does not have the seeds of separatism within it, and they would be fearful that support for Somaliland would imply support for secessionists within their own territories. Instead, African governments have told Somaliland that the most straightforward route to recognition, or at least resolution of its international status, lies through negotiations with Mogadishu.

But the Somali government is unwilling to allow Somaliland to secede, preferring the fiction of historical unity to the contemporary reality of separation. Yet Hargeisa knows that any attempt at reconciliation, at a Somaliland-Somali federation, would necessitate relying on a dysfunctional state in Mogadishu to deliver development and governance, a tall and probably quite foolish order. Somaliland would need some cast-iron guarantees.

To be worth the investment of time and resources, such negotiations should not presuppose the outcome of unity, but should have that option on the table along with independence and perhaps an additional third way such as a loose confederation or even a commonwealth of Somali-speaking nations. They would have to be facilitated by the African Union, not an external power bent on a certain option, as the unity-favouring Turks and Qataris have endeavoured.

There is a lot at stake for the international community. Somaliland’s security situation is stable because it is well-governed. It will not necessarily remain this way forever, not least since the Ethiopian government has become distracted from foreign policy concerns given the scale of its own internal difficulties.

The negotiations would have to include an “ante-nuptial contract” this time around, ensuring the divorce conditions are agreed beforehand. And they would require the donors pressurising both parties to the negotiating table, not playing silly buggers behind the scenes in picking winners and outcomes beforehand.

To be successful, negotiations over Somaliland’s future status, and thus the next stage of its recovery story, will require the sort of diplomacy and patience they were famous for in their internal peace process during the early 1990s.

Dr Mills and Van der Merwe are with the Brenthurst Foundation and have been in Hargeisa

FARIIN GAARA !

Ka fikir mustaqbalka Ubadkeena Siyaasiga Somaliland now Dantada gaarka ah ka horeysii Danta guud ee ubadka mustaqbalkooda ha kaga ciyaarin ee

ee noqo mid magac iyo waxqabad ka taga.

Waa madaxdii berito balse waxay u baahan yihiin in jadka loo sii xaadho xisbiyada siyaasada Somaliland waxaa la gudboon iney danta Qaranka meel uga soo wada jeestaan oo aaney noqon kuwo lagu khasaaro,saddexda xisbi ee kala ah Wadani ,Kulmiye iyo UCID waa iney noqdaan kuwo ka mideysan wadaniyada,dal jaceylka iyo horumarinta dhalinyarada waayeelka iyo dhaqaalaha dalka waana iney khilaafaadka dhexdooda ah ku dhameeyaan isku tanaasul iyo wada hadal dhexdooda ah. Xisbi siyaasadeed waa la sameystaa Balse Qaran sida loo helaa ma aha wax sahal ah.

Iran and the Problem of Occupation Warfare

For the U.S., defeating the Iranian military wouldn’t be the end of the war. By George Friedman – May 22, 2019

There has recently been a lot of talk about a war between the United States and Iran. In my view, it’s unlikely because the risks are too high for both countries. Iran can’t take the chance that its military would be destroyed, and the U.S. can’t accept the costs a real victory would entail. Since Korea, the United States has performed poorly in war, with the exception of Desert Storm, when the destruction of Iraqi forces allowed U.S. entry into Kuwait and no Kuwaiti resistance to American occupation emerged. But in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States faced the problem of what I would call occupation warfare, a type of combat that carries a substantial price even after the initial war has been won.

The Three Phases of War

Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz posited that there were three phases of war, each requiring different capabilities of warfare. The first phase is breaking the enemy’s military force, what we typically think of as military combat. The second is occupying the country, which involves the physical occupation of the defeated country and the establishment of the instruments of governance, production and consumption. The third is breaking the enemy’s ability to resist, which involves not only breaking its morale but also destroying any desire of the population to fight back against the occupiers.

The second phase is necessary because defeating an enemy military without occupying the country opens the door to the establishment of a new military force in the defeated country and a return to the strategic threat that sparked the war in the first place. After World War II, for example, the Allies had to occupy Germany and Japan or risk leaving in place the ability to resume the fighting and the political forces that posed the threat to begin with. In the final peace negotiations, therefore, the Americans insisted on occupation despite Japan’s resistance to it.

But the third phase of war didn’t emerge in either Japan or Germany for two reasons. First, and most important, the Allies had attacked not only the military but also the civilian population. Modern war involves hitting industrial targets, and factories are surrounded by people. Attacking the enemy’s industrial base means attacking its population, which dissolves any will to resist in the first place. The population, therefore, didn’t resist and the third phase never developed.

Second, even had there been a will to resist, the occupiers tried to rapidly identify weapons caches and destroy them. Leftover weapons could have been used to reignite the fighting, but eventually, new supplies would have to be obtained. Some might be stolen from the occupation force, but, with some exceptions, creating a force to resist the occupation requires an outside power willing to deliver materiel and a base from which to distribute it.

In Iraq, the United States defeated the Iraqi army within weeks and was able to quickly occupy the country. But the Iraqi army’s weapons had been cached in a number of places, and many Iraqi troops took weapons home. The United States had destroyed the Iraqi army and occupied the country but then faced the emergence of a force that had both the will and weapons to resist, obtained from both within and without the country. The United States failed at that third phase of war.

The Urge to Resist

In occupation warfare, the occupied have no hope of defeating or inflicting significant damage on the occupying military. But they can use their advantages to undermine the occupiers’ will to resist. The resisting force has several advantages, chief among them moral superiority. It is their country that’s being occupied, and the urge to resist is easy to generate. In addition, they have superior intelligence to the occupier and, therefore, a deeper sense of what’s happening. If the terrain permits, they can use it to cloak themselves. In urban environments, the city can make them invisible. Rooting the resistance out of a city is difficult and requires gathering intelligence from the civilian population, but their willingness to help is limited by their sympathy for the resistance, hatred of the occupier and fear of retribution. When the occupier carries out operations in populated areas, civilians are inevitably killed or wounded, increasing the population’s hostility and decreasing the opportunity for cooperation.

This is why occupation warfare is so difficult. It requires the occupier to craft a strategy appropriate for the occupied country, one based on knowledge of the country that the occupying force doesn’t have. The occupier, therefore, can’t obliterate the resisting force, but the resisting force can strike as and where it chooses, depending on its capability.

This means that the occupied win so long as they are not defeated, and the occupiers lose so long as the resistance continues. The resistance will try to create an unending war not because it expects to win but because it wants to break the will of its enemy to remain in the country. War must have a purpose and an end. The purpose for the resistance is clear. But over time, even the relatively low casualties being inflicted on the occupiers compel them to reconsider the political value of continuing to wage war. Clausewitz pointed out that war is the continuation of politics by other means, and that is nowhere truer than in occupation warfare. For years, the war can drag on with the assumption that withdrawal would undermine international credibility and that the occupier cannot allow itself to be defeated in this way. But in due course, the price of withdrawal becomes lower than the cost of maintaining the presence.

Occupation warfare, against a motivated and supplied resistance, is the most difficult type of warfare. It breaks an occupier not by main force but by steadily draining its resources. Some might say that the resistance cannot withstand overwhelming and brutal force. That may be true in some instances, but consider the German attempt to suppress Soviet partisan fighters and communists under Tito. The Germans had occupied the territory but couldn’t defeat the resistance despite extraordinary brutality. The partisans had the Pripet Marshes to hide in. Tito’s force had mountains. Both had a degree of outside supply. And both were highly motivated by the fact that surrender meant death. The very brutality of the occupier put steel into the resistance.

The Seduction of Victory

The United States can certainly destroy the Iranian military. It can also likely occupy Iran, but it would then be forced into occupation warfare. The Iranians would lose control of their country for an extended period of time. The costs would be too high for each side. The U.S. could of course bomb Iran, but only one country has ever capitulated after facing airstrikes alone: Yugoslavia in the Kosovo War. And even in this case, the capitulation had more to do with foreign diplomacy than the pain of war. Air power can cause tremendous damage but likely won’t force a country to back down. The end of war requires a political shift in an enemy, and air power usually can’t impose such a shift.

The United States has had experience with occupation warfare in Afghanistan and, in some sense, in Vietnam. In each case, the ability of the enemy to impose extended occupation warfare on the United States compelled the U.S., in the long run, to accept an outcome that was previously unthinkable. In Iraq, the German and Japanese examples from World War II led to the assumption that the final phase would not involve resistance. But those examples, it turns out, didn’t apply to the Iraq War.

There will be mutual threats and possibly even airstrikes and counterstrikes. But the destruction of the Iranian military would lead to occupation and necessitate breaking the will to resist. The dangers of occupation warfare are well known, but the calm after the destruction of the enemy’s military is the most dangerous point in war. It seduces the victorious government into imagining that this time will be different. It rarely is.

Source: GPF GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

18 KA MAY IYO 26 JUNE LABA JARANJARO OO TAARIIKHI AH!

Murti Somaliyeed baa waxay tidhaahdaa doqon loo sheegi maayo fariidna waa og yahay taas waxaa ka dhigan 18 May qof waxgarad ahi waa garanayaa doqona yeelkii oo waa kii nacasku yidhi maxaa la iga soo heley beriba waan lumiye.

Faa’iidada reer Somaliland ka heleen 18 May lama soo koobi karo balse waxaa ka mida:

1. Waxaa is cafiyey beelihii Somaliland ee uu kala qaybiyey keli taliyihii Maxamed Siyaad
2. Waxaa dib ula soo noqdeen  dadka reer Somaliland xoriyadii ay hadyada ugu geeyeen walaalahood somalidii konfureed
3. Waxaa ay 18 May dhashay dimoqraadiyada  Somaliland ka jirta ee lagu majeerto
4. Waxaa ka dhashay 3 saddexda xisbi ee qaran
5. Waxaa ka dhashay horumarka balaadhan ee nabadgelyadu kow ka tahay.
6. Waxaa ka dhashay ciidamada qaranka ee kala duwan,golayaasha wakiilada ee labada aqal golayaasha deegaanada ee doorashada ku yimi
7. Jaamicadaha,dugsiyada kala duwan
8. Ganacsiga xorta ah
9. Xoriyada qowlka,garsoorka iyo guud ahaan dawladnimada
10. Waxaa ka dhashey wadajirka bulshada Somaliland iyo isjecelka dhexdooda ah.

Dadka maanta oo 28 guuradii 18 May loo dabaal degayo ka soo horjeedaa waa dad dan gaara leh,waa dad ka xun horumarka dadka Somaliland,waa dad leh maxaa laysku saamaxay, oo dad leh miyaa laka aar goosto oo raba in dhiig soceeyo,nacayb, iyo burbur la raba dadka Somaliland ee walaalaha ah.

Dad aragtidii Siyaad bare ku hubeysan oo ay la tahay in ay kala qaybin karaan dadka reer Somaliland oo ay midba dheg wax ugu sheegaan taas waxaa markhaati u ah aragtida odhaneysa 18 May beel gaara baa leh,balse waxaa aan ogahay in aaney dadka reer Somaliland ahayn kuwii hore loo hodey ee layskaga horkeenay waa kuwo ka gudbay khiyaamooyinka salka ku haya reer reer nimada iyo reer baa reer xukuma waa kuwo og in ay Somaliland mid tahay oo ay 26 June 1960 Gumeysigii boqoryada Engiriiska ka qaadatey xoriyadeedii 1 July  1960 na la midowdey Somalidii konfureed, 18 May 1991 dib ula soo noqotey xoriyadii ay lumiyeen 1 July 1960 markii ay la midoobeen Konfurta Somaliya.

Hadal iyo dhamaan 18 May 1991 iyo 26 June 1960 waa laba jaranjaro oo taariikhi ah waana mataano wakhti madobi u dhaxeeyey kaas oo ah 1 July 1960 oo ay la midowdey konfurta ilaa Jan 27, 1991 oo ahayd markii uu muqdisho ka cararey Siyaad Bare.

Hambayo 18 May maalin taariikhda Somaliland qaali ku ah waa maalin ay murugoodaan xaasadka Somaliland waana Maalin ay Farxaan dadka wanaaga Somaliland Jecel.

Labadan professor Mid baa Xadhig lama Sitaan ah!

Faalo kooban:

Professor Galeydh malaha waa aanu is dhegeysan qudbadishiisa is khilaafsan oo marna inoogu balweeyo sida jirjiroolaha shirkii Burco waan fadhiyey, kii Booramana waan fadhiyey, oo shirkii Burco ee Somaliland lagu dhisey qayb baan ka ahaa marna uu inoogu luqeeyo waar meel aan Somaliland dhismaheeda kaga qaygaley ma Jiro,oo Somaliland lama wada laha.Sidaa darteed Cali Khaliif Galeydh waa Xadhig lama Sitaan, Balse Professor Samater waa nin wax badan og kana run sheeg badan, Aqoontuna ka muuqato markaa in aynu wax hagaajinaa waa muhiim balse Somaliland lama wada laha waa Jawaab raqiisa oo aan waqici ahayn.

Professor Galeydh malaha waa aanu is dhegeysan qudbadishiisa is khilaafsan oo marna inoogu balweeyo sida jirjiroolaha shirkii Burco waan fadhiyey, kii Booramana waan fadhiyey, oo shirkii Burco ee Somaliland lagu dhisey qayb baan ka ahaa marna uu inoogu luqeeyo waar meel aan Somaliland dhismaheeda kaga qaygaley ma Jiro,oo Somaliland lama wada laha.Sidaa darteed Cali Khaliif Galeydh waa Xadhig lama Sitaan, Balse Professor Samater waa nin wax badan og kana run sheeg badan, Aqoontuna ka muuqato markaa in aynu wax hagaajinaa waa muhiim balse Somaliland lama wada laha waa Jawaab raqiisa oo aan waqici ahayn.